Islamabad: Pakistan’s present President Asif Ali Zardari managed his first term by skilfully getting then incumbent Pervez Musharraf to resign in August 2008 by securing the backing of his successor as Army chief, and then, outmanoeuvring coalition ally Nawaz Sharif, his former aide has revealed.
While Zardari’s PPP and Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N had sought to impeach erstwhile military ruler Musharraf in August 2008 after winning the February 2008 elections, it was getting Musharraf’s handpicked successor as Army chief, Gen Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, on their side that did the trick, Zardari’s then spokesperson Farhatullah Babar reports in his memoirs, the News reported.
In “The Zardari Presidency”, Babar says Zardari, who was then the PPP co-chair, broached the issue of the potential ousting of Musharraf with Kayani.
Kayani, who was appointed the army vice chief in October 2007, setting the way for him to take over command when Musharraf, as long promised, shed his uniform in November that year, had no objections to the move.
The then army chief even suggested PPP leader Aftab Shaban Mirani, who had served as Defence Minister in the second Benazir Bhutto government, as the next President, Babar wrote in his book.
However, Zardari had his own eye on the Aiwan-e-Sadr.
Having the army behind him, Zardari then told trusted party members to move resolutions in provincial Assemblies demanding Musharraf’s impeachment, Babar said. Simultaneously, he conveyed a message through Major Gen Mahmud Ali Durrani (retd), urging Musharraf to resign or face impeachment.
Musharraf initially dismissed the ultimatum but eventually resigned in mid-August 2018.
However, according to Babar, Nawaz Sharif also sought to install himself as the President amid the PML-N and PPP alliance, where the latter was heading the government with its Yousaf Raza Gilani as the Prime Minister.
“My party thinks that I should become the President,” Sharif told Zardari in an informal chat, as per the book.
“Zardari replied with a laugh, ‘My party also thinks that I should become the President.’ The discussion ended there.”
Eventually, Zardari managed his elevation in September 2008.
Among other issues, Babar’s book also mentions how military pressure was mounted for the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry – whose sacking by Musharraf set in process a chain of crises that ended his rule.
According to Babar, neither Benazir Bhutto nor Zardari held favourable views of Justice Chaudhry, whom Zardari believed operated under the guise of independence while serving other interests.
During the long march from Lahore to demand Chaudhry’s restoration, Zardari faced pressure from his ministers and even Prime Minister Gilani to reinstate him. However, he remained steadfast in his stand.
Babar reports a “significant deployment” of the Triple One Brigade – the Rawalpindi-based army formation that has been involved in all the military coups of Pakistan – occurred inside the presidency on the night the march approached Islamabad.
“The manoeuvre may have created a perception of a military takeover, but it was not. It was optics for exerting pressure on Zardari to reinstate Chaudhry,” he wrote.
Amid mounting pressure for Chaudhry’s reinstatement, Zardari still held back, telling his advisers: “I know him inside and out. You people don’t. He will accept anything as long as he knows that he will be reinstated. He has been sending me messages. I know it. None of you knows about it.”
Babar notes that Chaudhry even offered a signed resignation letter in advance should he renege on his commitment. Chaudhry’s primary concern was his own reinstatement; he appeared indifferent to the reinstatement of other sacked judges, he wrote.
(IANS)
