Islamabad: A future agreement between the US and Iran will fail, not because diplomacy is inherently flawed, but due to structural contradictions embedded in the geopolitical architecture surrounding it, especially the continued reliance on Pakistan as a strategic intermediary, a report has stated.
“The recent suggestion that Pakistan could host or mediate US–Iran negotiations is not merely surprising; it is strategically concerning. It reflects a persistent tendency in US foreign policy to elevate Pakistan’s role beyond what its historical conduct justifies,” Najib Azad, a seasoned politician, author, founder and leader of the Bawar Movement, a political party in Kabul, wrote in the Eurasia Review.
“For decades, Pakistan has operated within a strategic framework often described as ‘strategic depth.’ In theory, this doctrine seeks to provide security buffers. In practice, it has frequently translated into influence through non-state actors, regional leverage, and calibrated instability. This is not a new phenomenon,” Azad stated.
He detailed that, during the Cold War, Pakistan was the central conduit for the US and supporting Afghan fighters under Operation Cyclone. The programme set up a vast infrastructure of militant networks, training pipelines, and ideological mobilisation that would outlast the conflict itself. These networks did not disappear with the end of the Cold War but they evolved and became central part in many regional conflicts.
After 9/11, Pakistan became a frontline ally in the war on terror, receiving financial and military assistance from the US. However, concerns were raised about Pakistan’s selective counterterrorism policies, militant safe havens, and the distinction between “good” and “bad” militants. Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad, which was in close proximity to Pakistan’s military academy, raised questions regarding institutional awareness, capacity, and intent. This duality, cooperation on one hand and contradiction on another has defined ties between Pakistan and the US for years. The same dynamic has been introduced amid the conflict in West Asia.
“Pakistan’s strategic posture has historically benefited from a degree of controlled instability. A stable and self-sufficient regional environment reduces its leverage, limits its strategic importance to external powers, and constrains the flow of economic and military assistance. Conversely, periods of tension and crisis reinforce Pakistan’s position as an indispensable actor. This dynamic has been observed repeatedly across decades of regional conflict. It also explains why the concept of Pakistan as a neutral mediator is problematic. Mediation requires more than access. It requires credibility, neutrality, and a demonstrated commitment to long-term stability. Pakistan’s historical record complicates all three,” Najib Azad wrote in Eurasia Review.
He spotlighted that, for years, Pakistan has faced allegations about its links to militant organisations operating in South Asia. These concerns have not only been raised by external observers. Instead, former Pakistani leaders themselves have publicly spoken about country’s past policy involving militant actors, especially in the context of Cold War and post-Cold War strategies.
“These acknowledgments reinforce a broader perception: that Pakistan’s security doctrine has, at times, incorporated non-state actors as instruments of influence. Whether framed as legacy policy or strategic necessity, the implications are significant. They shape how Pakistan is perceived not only as a regional actor, but as a participant in any diplomatic process. For US policymakers, this presents a fundamental dilemma. Engaging Pakistan may provide short-term tactical advantages. It may facilitate communication channels, logistical arrangements, and diplomatic access. But it also introduces long-term strategic risk. A peace process mediated or hosted by a state whose historical incentives have not consistently aligned with stability may struggle to achieve durability,” Azad stated.
(IANS)
