New Delhi: A section of Japanese media and people are criticising Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and her administration for their efforts to upgrade Japan’s defence and security systems, but these critics are overlooking China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region, according to an article published on the Japan Forward news website.
“The Pacific Islands have become an increasingly important arena of strategic competition between China and the United States and its regional partners,” the article stated.
While China may not be the largest provider of development finance to the Pacific, it has positioned itself as an integral development partner in the region.
China’s economic engagement with the Pacific has undergone a significant change. Its early expansion was associated with large infrastructure projects financed through Chinese policy-bank loans. This model generated considerable attention, particularly in Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. However, the latest Pacific Aid Map shows that Beijing has increasingly shifted towards smaller grants and more frequent projects, according to the article by Dr Pema Gyalpo.
It highlights that large infrastructure projects provide visibility but are expensive, slow to implement and potentially politically contentious because of debt obligations. Smaller grants can instead be distributed among schools, hospitals, government agencies, and local communities, producing a larger number of recurring interactions between Chinese representatives and Pacific institutions.
The change is consequently better understood as a shift from capital-intensive engagement to relationship-intensive engagement. China does not need to become the region’s largest donor to increase its political presence, if its assistance is concentrated in strategically significant states and institutions.
The diplomatic dimension is particularly evident in the Pacific’s relationship with Taiwan. Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, while Nauru followed in 2024. These decisions reduced Taiwan’s diplomatic presence in the Pacific and expanded the number of governments formally committed to Beijing’s “one-China” principle.
While it would be simplistic to attribute these decisions solely to Chinese aid, the combination of diplomatic engagement, development assistance and political incentives has strengthened Beijing’s position in the region, the article stated.
Chinese state-owned enterprises have also become significant participants in Pacific infrastructure markets. Their involvement is particularly important because Chinese firms can secure contracts financed by multilateral development institutions rather than Beijing itself.
The most significant development, however, has been the expansion of Chinese engagement into domestic security institutions.
The 2022 China-Solomon Islands security agreement attracted considerable attention because of concerns about a possible Chinese military presence. Yet the subsequent development of Chinese police cooperation may be more consequential than the question of a conventional military base, the article opines.
(IANS)
