New Delhi: After four days of intense military exchanges that sent tremors across global capitals, India and Pakistan on Saturday agreed to a ceasefire, with a decisive difference — this time, it is a ceasefire dictated entirely by New Delhi’s terms. Far from being a product of diplomatic pressure or third-party mediation, as seen in previous decades, the 2025 ceasefire represents a historic doctrinal and strategic shift under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, say security analysts.
To appreciate the gravity of this moment, one must understand the historical arc of India-Pakistan ceasefires. In July 1949, the Karachi Agreement laid the groundwork for a ceasefire monitored by the United Nations, with negotiations largely shaped by US influence and global Cold War politics.
India “accepted UN monitoring and international oversight in the name of peace, setting a precedent of externally imposed frameworks”.
In 1965, following a costly war in which India gained significant ground, UN Security Council Resolution 211 enforced a ceasefire. What followed was the Tashkent Declaration — brokered primarily by the USSR and the USA—under which India handed back all commanding gains in a show of diplomatic restraint that, in retrospect, cost India dearly, say strategic experts.
The 1971 war saw India at its zenith militarily, leading to the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops.
Yet, under ‘intense geopolitical pressure’, India signed the Simla Agreement without extracting strategic concessions. Pakistan retained PoJK, no effort was made to formalise the Line of Control (LoC) as an international boundary, and the humanitarian and security burdens of the refugee influx were left unaddressed. Worse, India unilaterally released all prisoners of war, gaining little in return, say observers.
Subsequent episodes — from the IPKF withdrawal in Sri Lanka in 1990 to the Kargil ceasefire in 1999 brokered by the Clinton administration — have shown a recurring pattern: military resolve diluted under external pressure or political caution.
But 2025 is different. The post-Pahalgam response — Operation Sindoor — marked a calibrated, precise, and overwhelming kinetic retaliation, taking out nine major terror camps across Pakistan and PoJK.
India not only demonstrated tri-services coordination and air superiority but also signalled the emergence of a new national doctrine: from now on, any act of terror will be treated as an act of war. This places India among a select group of nations—like the U.S. and Israel—that have explicitly codified retaliatory doctrines in response to asymmetric warfare.
In addition, India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) remains intact despite the ceasefire — another signal of India’s refusal to normalise relations while Pakistan sponsors cross-border terrorism. Crucially, the World Bank has now withdrawn from its traditional role as guarantor of the IWT, further weakening Pakistan’s position.
Unlike previous decades, there was no role played by a third party in brokering the ceasefire. The initiative came directly from Pakistan’s DGMO, and India agreed only after ensuring its strategic and operational objectives were met. This bilateral ceasefire stands in stark contrast to those of the past — it is not an end to Indian pressure but a pause in kinetic activity. Trade sanctions, visa restrictions, diplomatic downgrades, and water leverage remain firmly in place.
Today, India is the fifth-largest economy in the world, a key technological power, and a global voice. Pakistan, meanwhile, is economically bankrupt, diplomatically isolated, and strategically cornered. The contrast could not be sharper.
The ceasefire of 2025 is not a return to status quo — it is a message. A new India has arrived, and it is no longer willing to indulge a rogue neighbour whose state machinery thrives on jihad and instability. The guns may have quieted, but India’s grip — military, economic, and diplomatic — remains firm and unyielding.
(IANS)
