New Delhi: The Supreme Court on Thursday dismissed a writ petition filed by High Court judge, Justice Yashwant Varma – who faces an impeachment threat following the cash discovery episode – challenging the in-house enquiry that led to a report recommending his removal from office.
In a detailed judgment, a Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and A.G. Masih framed several key questions, including: the maintainability of Justice Varma’s petition, the legal sanction of the in-house procedure, whether the in-house procedure constitutes a parallel and extra-constitutional mechanism, whether it violates the fundamental rights of a High Court judge, whether due procedure was followed; and whether forwarding the in-house panel’s report was unconstitutional.
“We have no hesitation to say that the CJI is not a mere post office between the in-house committee and the President/the Prime Minister that the probe report is to be forwarded without any remarks or recommendation,” the Justice Datta-led Bench observed.
The CJI is clearly an important person, if not the most, in the larger scheme of maintaining institutional interest and credibility to ascertain whether a judge has indulged in misconduct, it added.
The apex court found “no justification” in the contention that the CJI may not express his own views while forwarding the in-house committee’s report, stating: “The report of inquiry may, or may not, find the allegations against the judge to be serious enough to warrant any measure. However, if it does, the Chief Justice is under an obligation to forward the report to the President and the Prime Minister. We see no justification to hold that, in so forwarding, the Chief Justice may not express his own views.”
It added that where the in-house probe committee finds substance in the allegations, and the misconduct is serious enough to warrant initiation of removal proceedings, the CJI does have the authority, in a fit and proper case, to endorse such findings while forwarding the inquiry report.
Responding to the contention that the CJI’s recommendation could prejudice Members of Parliament, the Justice Datta-led Bench said: “The opinion is not forwarded either to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or to the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. Even if it is assumed that Members of Parliament have had access to the recommendation/advice of the CJI, if any, nothing much turns on it.”
On the applicability of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, the apex court held that the law does not shield judges from internal disciplinary mechanisms like the in-house procedure.
“The Protection Act does not offend the constitutional scheme present; and, being in addition to the extant provisions, does not affect the Supreme Court’s authority to take such action, as deemed fit, against a Judge of a High Court who is alleged to have indulged in misconduct in terms of the procedure,” it said.
The inquiry that is part of the in-house procedure is designed to be a fact-finding inquiry as distinguished from a guilt-finding inquiry; and it is, therefore, akin to a preliminary inquiry that precedes regular disciplinary proceedings against a delinquent employee, the top court held.
“We have no hesitation to hold that the nature of inquiry in the instant case is preliminary, ad-hoc and not final as well as not violative of any principle of natural justice,” said the Justice Datta-led Bench.
Questioning Justice Varma’s writ petition, it asked if it was not incumbent for him to point out any perceived fault or flaw in the procedure before submitting to the jurisdiction of the in-house committee.
“Once the petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction, is it not to be presumed that he did so expecting a favourable outcome and the writ petition came to be filed only when the outcome was not palatable to him?” the bench remarked.
Further, it held that the in-house inquiry or its report in itself does not lead to the removal of a judge, and thus, “the in-house inquiry is not a removal mechanism in the first place, much less an extra-constitutional mechanism”.
The apex court said that the in-house procedure laid down is “fair and just”, which does not compromise judicial independence – a basic feature of the Constitution.
“If a complaint of misconduct committed by a judge is received and if at an inquiry conducted under the in-house procedure the allegations against such a judge are found to have sufficient substance, he cannot claim any immunity – either by citing abrogation of his fundamental rights or breach of the constitutional scheme for removal of a judge by initiating proceedings for impeachment – that his conduct is not open to be commented upon by the committee or even by the CJI,” the Supreme Court ruled.
In his writ petition, Justice Varma contended that the removal of a judge of a constitutional court from office must be based on a finding of proved misbehaviour or incapacity in an inquiry conducted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.
He added that the in-house procedure—inasmuch as it could trigger removal proceedings without adhering to the constitutional safeguards—is liable to be held ultra vires.
Further, the petition contended that the in-house enquiry committee report could only be used by the CJI to take corrective measures within his domain and cannot interfere with the process envisaged under Article 124 (dealing with the process of removal of a judge).
Under the constitutional scheme, the CJI has no authority to recommend the initiation of removal proceedings, as such an opinion could prejudice Members of Parliament and violate the spirit of the separation of powers, the plea added.
Justice Varma has been at the centre of controversy after a fire broke out in the store-room attached to his official bungalow, uncovering a stash of burnt currency notes. Although he denied any wrongdoing and claimed it was a conspiracy, a three-member committee constituted under the in-house procedure investigated the matter, indicted him, and opined that the allegations were serious enough to warrant the initiation of removal proceedings.
(IANS)
